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Big Picture Cognitive Warfare Joel Fishman, Stopping the Man in the Green Helmet, Makor Rishon, 7/7/07
Big Picture Cognitive Warfare Joel Fishman, Stopping the Man in the Green Helmet, Makor Rishon, 7/7/07
| Joel Fishman, Stopping the Man in the Green Helmet, Makor Rishon, 7/7/07 |
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Joel Fishman, European historian and student of cognitive warfare, describes Hizbullah's success in the media theater of the Lebanon War (2006).  The article so pleased Hizbullah that they put it up at their English site.  Joel Fishman Makor Rishon 07 July 2007  Stopping the Man in the Green Helmet: How Israel could lose the Next Battle of the Media War  A year has passed since the outbreak of the Second Lebanon War and there could be another round soon. The Winograd Commission of investigation has published its report on the first days of the war last July. Hopefully, the second part of the report will deal with Israel's failures in the media. For the present, it is worthwhile to devote some attention to the public debate on the subject. Shortly after the cease-fire in mid-August 2006, retired ambassador Zvi Mazel published a critique entitled "Tsipi, you failed" (Y-net, on 24 August 2006). Mazel accused Foreign Minister Livni of not doing her job in presenting the government's position in the media during the war.  And, Ra'anan Gisin, former Spokesman for the Prime Minister, published "Want to win the media war? Don’t Apologize,†Y-net, 11 September 2006. More recently, two important articles appeared in the Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs: one by Zev Furst, an American media expert, and the other by retired ambassador Zalman Shoval. Separately, the veteran American journalist and media expert, Marvin Kalb, with Carol Seivitz, published The Israeli-Hezbollah War of 2006: The Media As A Weapon in Asymmetrical Conflict (February 2007). This partial selection of literature indicates an awareness and concern that Israel has failed to make its case in the media and that there is an urgent need for rethinking and improvement.    All agree that for the most part, the Hizballah controlled the media message and that the government of Israel was not capable of presenting a coordinated message to the press. This is not a recent development. Five years ago, the State Comptroller dealt with the same problem of media failures in the context of the Palestinians' Second Armed Uprising (Annual Report [53] of 2002), as follows:  "The apparatus of Hasbarah of the Foreign Ministry was not prepared on time for the possibility of an armed confrontation with the Palestinians, and preparation of plans of action for Hasbarah abroad were totally lacking, particularly addressing the needs which would be urgently required for sensitive fronts of confrontation. A major part of various work processes held in common in the area of foreign Hasbarah, which were concentrated in the Foreign Ministry, such as the procedure of coordinating foreign Hasbarah were not carried out. The Foreign Ministry was not even designated as the leading professional coordinator for the field of Hasbarah abroad. As a result, the professional aspect of the work of Hasbarah was not dealt with comprehensively: a center of professional knowledge designated for foreign Hasbarah was not developed, and, in any case, there was no professional guidance for Hasbarah abroad for all of the government parties dealing with it in the State of Israel." Little has changed since the State Comptroller's report. At the very least, this problem deserves be considered on its own merits and not as a partisan or ideological issue. The enemy uses the media as a tool of warfare in order to achieve two specific objectives: to delegitimize the Jewish state and to paralyze Israel's will to use its superior military force effectively. This is entirely different from projecting a favorable image, or branding, operations which have more to do with advertising and public relations. For example, on 31 July 2006, during the visit of Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice in Jerusalem, the Hizballah either staged the scene of the bombing of Kfar Kana or exploited a tragedy with outstanding expertise. Thoughtlessly, Prime Minister Olmert announced an immediate temporary suspension of the bombing of Lebanon. Thus, through its use of the press, the enemy won a significant military advantage. The government spokesperson apologized immediately on CNN. Eager to apologize and totally lacking dignity, she was unable to face down an aggressive interviewer.  Here was the State of Israel which had embarked on a war of self defense and was in possession the moral high ground, publicly shamed by the international media and placed on the defensive. The enemy turned the tables.  This was not the first time, however, that through skillful use of the media, Israel had been paralyzed and forced to curtail military action. We should recall the phony Jenin Massacre during the military campaign "Defensive Shield," in April 2002. No massacre took place; there was a battle between the Israel Defense Forces and Palestinian terrorists. The false accusation of a massacre damaged Israel terribly and almost resulted in a UN commission of investigation with such righteous figures international standing as Desmond Tutu and Mary Robinson. On the military level, our enemies have been able to create a situation where Israel hesitates to use its superior military force and expertise in its own defense. This was also a major strategic accomplishment. Israel's leaders must find suitable responses to the enemies' tactics of media warfare. They must find a way to neutralize the influence of figures such as the producer\director of the scene at Kfar Kana, who wore a green helmet and his evil collaborators in the Western media. If not, Israel will suffer more miserable defeats in the media battle. Such failures in the war for public opinion carry a high military and political price.  Dr. Joel Fishman is a Fellow of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.
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