UNDERSTANDING
THE GOLDSTONE REPORT

The mission's general approach

The report makes every effort to downplay Hamas crimes. Hamas and other terrorist entities are described by the benign term "Palestinian armed groups." In some cases, the mission simply declines to examine Hamas misdeeds. One example of this inaction regards Shifa Hospital in Gaza. Despite ample grounds indicating that a Hamas command center was located in the hospital, the report states that it did "not investigate the case of Al-Shifa hospital and is not in a position to make any finding with regard to these allegations" (p. 466).

Clear evidence unfavorable to Hamas is either discarded or "reinterpreted." For instance, during the operation, Islam Shahwan, spokesman for the Hamas police force, stated that "police officers received clear orders from the leadership to face the [Israeli] enemy." However, this clear admission as to the role of the Hamas police takes on new meaning when the mission uncritically accepts Shahwan's explanation that his intention was that in the event of an invasion, the police would continue to uphold public order and ensure the movement of essential supplies (p. 414). A statement by the commander of Hamas's Executive Force (p. 410) that his group acted as "resistance fighters" received similar benign interpretation (p. 416).

Reliable evidence supporting the Israeli position received completely different treatment.

In an effort to explain its targeting of sensitive locations, Israel submitted to the mission photographic evidence showing the launching of rockets from within or near residential buildings, schools, mosques and hospitals. However, the mission had no qualms in discounting them on the grounds that it could not determine whether the photos showed what is alleged, and that many photos related to firing of rockets from Gaza before the operation (p. 449).

The mission even denied requests to invite witnesses such as Col. Kemp, who was likely to support the Israeli position. The explanations offered by Goldstone for this unbalanced treatment are not much stronger than those he provided for keeping Chinkin on the mission.

Much of the evidence gathered by the mission was most likely tainted. Members of the mission were accompanied during their visit to Gaza by Hamas officials, a group which deliberately and consistently pursues a policy of disinformation. It is highly improbable that the mission could get a true picture of Hamas's misdeeds and of what really happened. Indeed, the report admits that the witnesses interviewed appeared "reluctant to speak about the presence or conduct of hostilities by the Palestinian armed groups" - a reluctance which "may have stemmed from a fear of reprisals" (p. 438).

This behavior by the Islamic group has been aptly described by Kemp:

"Hamas, like Hizbullah, are expert at driving the media agenda. Both will always have people ready to give interviews condemning Israeli forces for war crimes. They are adept at staging and distorting incidents."